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Abstract
In my recent experimental research of wholesale electricity auctions, I dis-
covered that the complex structure of the offers leaves a lot of room for strategic
behavior, which consequently leads to anti- competitive and inefficient outcomes
in the market. A specific feature of these complex-offer auctions is that the sellers
submit not only the quantities and the minimum prices at which they are willing
to sell, but also the start-up fees that are designed to reimburse the fixed start-
up costs of the generation plants. In this paper, using the experimental method I
compare the performance of two complex-offer auctions (COAs) against the per-
formance of a simple-offer auction (SOA), in which the sellers have to recover all
their generation costs — fixed and variable —through a uniform market-clearing
price. I find that the SOA significantly reduces consumer prices and lowers price
volatility. It mitigates anti-competitive effects that are present in the COAs and
achieves allocative efficiency more quickly.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification: C72, D4, D61, L94
Keywords: strategic behavior, sealed-bid auction, complex offer auction, elec-
tricity, efficiency
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1. Introduction 
Many wholesale electric power markets employ auctions that differ from other 
widely used quantity-price offer auctions in their offer complexity. Besides the quantities 
and the minimum prices that the electricity generators are willing to sell at, the sellers 
may also declare their technical constraints and start-up fees that are designed to 
reimburse the fixed start-up costs of the plants. The generation contracts are generally 
allocated by a sealed-offer auction that employs a computationally involved market-
clearing algorithm. Besides applying a rule for offer selection, a market-clearing 
algorithm has to ensure that the system demand and reserve requirements are met over a 
particular time period. Recently, I compared the performance of two such algorithms by 
using laboratory experiments (Baltaduonis 2007). The major finding is that the sellers 
exploit the offer complexity to extract higher payments from the buyers. Consequently, 
the resulting outcomes are substantially inefficient. In this paper, I use laboratory 
experiments to contrast the performance of these complex-offer auctions (COAs) against 
the performance of a simple-offer auction (SOA). In the SOA, the sellers can recover 
their generation costs – both fixed and variable – only through a uniform market-clearing 
price. The paper investigates whether the SOA could mitigate the anti-competitive 
behavior present in the COAs. 
Two complex-offer auctions that I discuss in this paper differ from each other in 
their market-clearing algorithms. An offer cost minimization (OCM) algorithm is 
currently used by independent system operators (ISOs) in the United States. It relies on 
the traditional unit commitment approach.2 The algorithm minimizes the total offered 
cost of electricity, as if all selected sellers would be paid their offered prices and fees. 
                                                 
2 For a bibliographical survey on the unit commitment problem see Padhy (2004). 
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Sequentially, after the offers are selected, a uniform market-clearing price is determined 
as the highest accepted price for that period. All selected sellers receive their individual 
start-up fees and the uniform market-clearing price for the supplied electricity during that 
period. 
Yan and Stern (2002) point out that the OCM algorithm does not ensure the lowest 
procurement cost of electricity to consumers for a given set of offers. This motivated Luh 
et al. (2005a) to develop a payment cost minimization (PCM) algorithm that minimizes 
the actual procurement cost of electricity, simultaneously determining a market-clearing 
price as the highest accepted price during that period. As in the OCM auction, the 
selected sellers would receive their individual start-up fees and the uniform market-
clearing price for the supplied electricity. 
Mixed integer programming problems, similar to the OCM and the PCM 
algorithms, have been actively studied in electrical engineering for several decades 
because of potential savings in generation costs. The improvement of these mechanisms 
heavily depended on the assumption of complete information about the generation costs 
of electricity. Even if such an assumption might be practical in a regulated or state-owned 
electricity system, there is no guarantee that complete information would be available to 
an ISO in a deregulated electricity market. One might hope that competitive forces in the 
market would induce the sellers to reveal their true generation costs. If so, the ISOs could 
continue to use the developed allocation programs. Unfortunately, this seems to be 
unlikely in the case of complex-offer auctions. Baltaduonis (2007) shows that in both the 
OCM and the PCM auctions, sellers significantly raise the start-up fees and prices over 
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their true start-up costs and variable generation costs even in a competitive environment. 
Such behavior leads to both allocative and production inefficiencies. 
This paper investigates the performance of a SOA, holding constant all other 
characteristics of the system described by Baltaduonis (2007). The SOA is a less 
computationally involved auction than the COAs. On the other hand, the exact revelation 
of electricity generation costs is impossible in the SOA. The sellers have to mark up their 
offered prices to account for the fixed start-up costs or they might incur losses. If the 
study shows that the complex-offer auctions do provide value-added, it could help to 
improve market mechanisms for industries where the fixed cost component is an 
important production characteristic. 
There are other studies of strategic behavior by sellers in the complex-offer auctions 
used in wholesale electricity markets. Knoblauch (2005) points out that if suppliers tailor 
their offers to the type of auction they face, it is no longer obvious that the PCM auction 
will generate lower procurement costs. Shunda (2005) extends Knoblauch’s analysis by 
including strategic capacity withholding behavior between day-ahead and real-time 
markets for electricity. Baltaduonis (2006) uses a game theoretic approach to analyze the 
performance of the OCM and the PCM auctions with regards to efficiency. This paper, to 
my knowledge, is the first experimental study that contrasts simple- and complex-offer 
auctions in the context of electricity markets. As in Rassenti, Smith & Wilson (2003a, 
2003b), hereafter RSW, the analysis allows for strategic behavior, strictly controls for the 
level of unilateral market power, and simulates trading environments with minimal 
demand elasticity, cyclical demand uncertainties and an absence of significant excess 
generation capacity. 
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The paper is organized as follows. Market Institution, Structure, and Environment 
outlines the market structure in the experiment and provides an example that highlights 
the major differences among the three auctions. This section describes market power in a 
sealed COA. Experimental Design and Procedures describes the design and procedures 
of the experiment, and Results presents the findings. Conclusions summarizes and 
discusses the implications for public policy. 
 
2. Market Institution, Structure, and Environment 
To isolate the institutional effects of the strategically complex auctions, I examine a 
very simple environment, relative to actual electric power systems: (i) transmission 
constraints are negligible; (ii) generators have no physical ramping rates; (iii) security 
reserves and other ancillary services to protect the system from outages are ignored; and 
(iv) a trading institution accepts flat offer curves for each generating unit. Such an 
environment is most comparable to the day-ahead wholesale markets of observed power 
systems. Hour-ahead and real-time power markets are organized in a similar fashion. The 
performance of the SOA is measured against the OCM and the PCM auctions in a 
stationary supply and cyclic demand environment, strictly controlling for unilateral 
market power. 
 
2.1. Auction Institution 
The objective of this paper is to compare the performance of a SOA versus two 
COA rules (OCM and PCM), while holding constant all other characteristics of the 
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system – the costs and structure of supply, the resale values and structure of demand. The 
criteria for evaluation are consumer prices, efficiency and price volatility. Since demand-
side bidding is often absent in the naturally occurring spot markets for electricity, a 
computer is used to submit bids that perfectly reveal the demand at any point in time in 
all experiments, as in RSW. The sellers privately submit a schedule of offers, i.e. plant 
start-up fees and prices, for their production capacity for each pricing period. The offers 
and the computerized bids are then sent to a market-clearing algorithm to allocate the 
production contracts for the next day. Each day consists of four pricing periods: night 
(low demand/off peak period), morning (medium demand/shoulder period), afternoon 
(high demand/peak period) and evening (medium demand/shoulder period). Four pricing 
periods during the day are a simplification of the naturally occurring day-ahead electricity 
markets where separate prices are instituted hourly. Nevertheless, the cyclical dynamics 
of the demand are preserved.  
Currently, the dominant practice in the electricity spot markets is to employ 
uniform price auctions, where each seller receives the same market price for the sold 
megawatts. The market price is usually the highest accepted price per megawatt among 
all of the sellers. I retain these institutional features and leave aside the discussion of 
“pay-as-offered” discriminatory price auctions.3 In all experimental treatments, i.e. 
OCM, PCM and SOA, the sellers are paid uniform prices and their individual start-up 
fees. Note that in the SOA, the start-up fees are simply constrained to be zero.  
In the case of a uniform-price auction where sellers ask for fixed start-up fees, the 
mechanism of distributing these fees across consumers is important. One way to do that 
                                                 
3 For experimental investigations of uniform price versus discriminatory price auctions with simple offers 
see Mount, Schulze, Thomas & Zimmerman (2001), and Rassenti, Smith & Wilson (2003b). 
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is to divide the borne fees equally over the units dispatched during the period for which 
the extra generation capacity was called. The markup on offered price creates a gap 
between a uniform price that all sellers receive and a uniform price that all buyers pay. In 
this experiment, both the OCM and the PCM algorithms employ this method to compute 
the buyer prices and to determine the corresponding levels of demand. Note that a 
uniform price that all sellers receive and a uniform price that all buyers pay are the same 
in the SOA due to the absence of start-up fees. 
The following numerical example demonstrates the principles of the offer-selection 
rules for all three auctions. 
 
Example: A Simple Wholesale Electricity Market 
To highlight the major differences in the preceding market-clearing rules, I use a 
three-supplier market described by Knoblauch (2005). Consider an electricity market for 
one hour. The demand is inelastic and equal to 2 units. Supplier 1 (S1) and Supplier 2 
(S2) are identical. They incur 6 dollars of fixed costs to start up their plants and 93 dollars 
of variable costs to generate one unit of electricity. Each of them can supply 0, 1 or 2 
units of energy. Supplier 3 (S3) has start-up cost of 20 dollars and energy cost of 70 
dollars per unit. She can supply 0 or 1 unit of energy.  
For the purpose of this example suppose that all suppliers submit offers that reflect 
their true production costs. Since the fees are constrained to be zero in the SOA, the 
suppliers would incur losses unless they recover their fixed costs through the prices. 
Therefore, in the SOA, the fixed cost can be evenly distributed over the energy cost at the 
full capacity level of a plant. In this case, S1 and S2 would submit offers of 96 (=93+6÷2) 
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dollars per unit and S3 would submit an offer of 90 (=70+20) dollars per unit. Given 
these offers the three auctions would generate the following outcomes. 
 
The OCM Auction 
The OCM algorithm minimizes the total offered cost of electricity, as if all selected 
sellers would be paid their offered prices and fees. Given the offers, an ISO calculates the 
minimum offered cost from two cases: 1) buying 2 units from either S1 or S2, OR 2) 
buying 1 unit from S3 and 1 unit from S1(S2): 
 
Min{Price1,2×2+Fee1,2 , Price3+Fee3+Price1,2+Fee1,2}, 
Min{93×2+6, 70+20+93+6}=70+20+93+6=189. 
  
The auction chooses to buy 1 unit from S3 and 1 unit from S1(S2). After the offers 
are selected, a uniform market-clearing price is determined as the highest accepted price 
for that period; the market price is 93 (=max{70, 93}). All selected sellers receive their 
individual start-up fees and the uniform market price for the supplied electricity during 
that period; the total procurement cost of electricity is 212 (=93×2+20+6). The uniform 
market price that all buyers pay is 106 [=93+(20+6)÷2)]. Notice that this contract 
allocation is production efficient, since there is no way to generate 2 units of electricity 
cheaper than the chosen suppliers do. 
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The PCM Auction 
The PCM algorithm minimizes the actual procurement cost of electricity, 
simultaneously determining a market-clearing price as the highest accepted price during 
that period. An ISO calculates the minimum procurement cost in two cases: 1) buying 2 
units from either S1 or S2, OR 2) buying 1 unit from S3 and 1 unit from S1(S2): 
 
Min{Price1,2×2+Fee1,2 , max{Price3 , Price1,2}×2+Fee3+Fee1,2}, 
Min{93×2+6, max{70, 93}×2+20+6}=93×2+6=192. 
 
The auction chooses to buy 2 units from S1(S2). The market-clearing price is 93. As 
in the OCM auction, the selected sellers receive their individual start-up fees and the 
uniform market-clearing price for the supplied electricity. Both the total procurement cost 
and the total generation cost are equal to 192 (=93×2+6). The market price for buyers is 
96 (=93+6÷2). This contract allocation is not production efficient, since S3’s plant with 
relatively lower average total cost is idle. 
 
Both the OCM and the PCM auctions are designed to sell the maximum amount of 
electricity where buyers’ marginal willingness to pay is higher or equal to the average 
procurement cost. Tied offer combinations in the OCM auction are chosen in a way that 
generates lower procurement cost. Tied offer combinations in the PCM auction are 
selected by giving priority to those sellers whose offered cost is lower. Such a tie 
breaking mechanism gives the best performance chances to both complex-offer auctions, 
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though to achieve similar tie breaking in real life applications would require additional 
costly computational power and time. 
 
The Simple-Offer Auction 
Notice that there is no difference between the OCM and the PCM auctions when the 
start-up fees are constrained to be zero. Minimizing offer cost or payment cost produces 
exactly the same contract allocation. Thus, either the OCM or the PCM algorithm could 
be used for the SOA by simply constraining all start-up fees to be zero. In the discussed 
example, an ISO considers two options: 1) buying 2 units from either S1 or S2, OR 2) 
buying 1 unit from S3 and 1 unit from S1(S2): 
 
Min{Price1,2×2 , Price3+Price1,2}, 
Min{96×2, 90+96}=90+96=186. 
 
The auction chooses to buy 1 unit from S3 and 1 unit from S1(S2). The market-
clearing price is 96. The selected sellers receive the uniform market-clearing price for the 
supplied electricity. The total procurement cost of electricity is equal to 192 (=96×2). 
This contract allocation is production efficient, since there is no way to generate 2 units 
of electricity cheaper than the chosen suppliers do. However, this outcome is problematic 
because S1(S2) is not able to recover all production costs and incurs a loss of -3 (=96-93-
6). Since this outcome can not be sustained in the long run, S1(S2) would be forced to 
increase the offer in order to recover the fixed cost even when she sells only 1 unit of 
energy. The minimum sustainable offer is 99 dollars per unit. In this case, the outcome is: 
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 Min{99×2, 90+99}=90+96=189. 
 
The auction chooses to buy 1 unit from S3 and 1 unit from S1(S2). The market price 
for both buyers and sellers is 99. The total procurement cost of electricity is equal to 198 
(=99×2). The contract allocation is production efficient. 
 
In the presented example, given the assumption of truthful production cost 
revelation, the PCM auction produces the lowest procurement cost of electricity. It 
slightly outperforms the SOA and more significantly the OCM auction. On the other 
hand, the PCM auction is the only one to yield a production inefficient allocation. Notice 
that in the case of perfectly inelastic demand, production efficiency is equivalent to 
allocative efficiency. In the complex-offer auctions, the suppliers are able to reveal their 
costs and be reimbursed in a way that the costs are incurred. In the SOA, the sellers have 
to think how to recover the fixed costs through the offered prices. The SOA example 
shows that the sellers might face a risk of short-term losses.  
Baltaduonis (2007) shows that the assumption of truthful production cost revelation 
cannot be reasonable in the complex-offer auctions. Due to the complex strategic 
behavior, both the OCM and the PCM auctions result in equally inefficient and costly 
outcomes. This paper investigates whether a SOA can curtail the anti-competitive 
behavior that is present in the COAs. A higher risk of losses in the SOA is a concern and 
is addressed in this paper as well. 
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2.2. Experimental Environment 
Concerns about market power in the electric power industry abound. In the 
experiment, I develop a market environment that strictly controls for structural features of 
market power. Given the inelastic nature of the market demand for electricity, one might 
want to know which trading rules are more effective in suppressing the exercise of 
market power. Baltaduonis (2007) reports that both the OCM and the PCM auctions 
produce anti-competitive outcomes, even in the treatments with no market power. Since 
the SOA reduces the scope of possible strategic behavior, I hypothesize that the SOA 
should increase competitiveness in the market. This paper reports the findings related to 
the SOA performance in the same environment as described by Baltaduonis (2007). 
In the context of capacity-constrained competitors, Holt (1989) defines market 
power as the ability to deviate profitably and unilaterally from the competitive outcome. 
Baltaduonis (2007) demonstrates that in the COAs, the offer complexity and the cyclical 
nature of the market demand for electricity create incentives to start-up plants during the 
higher demand periods. Consequently, the incentives to compete for baseload or shoulder 
demand units vanish even with the presence of cheap excess generation capacity. In fact, 
given the offer complexity and the cyclical nature of demand, it becomes impossible to 
design an environment with no market power, as defined by Holt, during the lower 
demand periods. However, opting for a SOA should eliminate these anticompetitive 
incentives while keeping the market supply unchanged. The theoretical reasoning follows 
the description of the designed environment. 
Tables 1 and 2, as well as Figure 1 depict aggregate supply and demand in the 
experimental environment. Following RSW, I assume that the buyers perfectly reveal 
 12
their willingness to pay. The second and third steps of the demand in Table 1 represent 
interruptible units of demand, whereas the units on the first step at 250 are the “must 
serve” units. The level of “must serve” demand varied among three levels: 1 unit in off-
peak periods, 4 units during shoulder periods, and 14 units during peak periods. 
 
2.2.1. Supply & Demand 
 
Figure 1. Market Structure and Design 
Table 1. Demand Schedules 
Demand Quantity (demand values) 
 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 
Off-peak 1 (250) 1 (80) N/A 
Shoulder 4 (250) 2 (230) 1 (160) 
Peak 14 (250) 2 (230) 2 (160) 
I 
D 
A B 
C D
A 
E E F G G 
H 
S1 S2 S3 
S4 S5 S6 
S3 S4 S6 S5 S2 
S1 
 
  
S4 
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
Units
Price 
120 
160 
200 
  80 
  40 
280 
240 
Off-peak 
Demand 
Shoulder 
Demand 
Peak 
Demand 
 
“Must Serve” Demand 
Interruptible 
Demand 
Supply 
(ATC) 
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 In the designed market, there are thirteen plants of nine types. The technical 
characteristics of each plant are presented in Table 2. Some of them have low start-up 
costs with high production costs per unit, while other plants have high start-up costs but 
lower production costs. In the No Power treatment reported in this paper, all plants are 
owned by six firms (or sellers) denoted by an “S” and an identification number. S1 and S2 
own two low cost (Type A) generation plants and two high cost generation plants (Type 
H and G respectively). S3 and S4 own two high cost (Type E) plants and, respectively, 
one baseload (Type B) generation plant and one intermediate cost (Type C) plant where 
generation capacity is one unit. S4 also owns a very high cost (Type I) peak capacity 
plant with average total cost exceeding even the resale value at the “must serve” level. 
Each S5 and S6 own one intermediate cost (Type D) plant and one high cost (Type G and 
F respectively) peak capacity generation plant.  
 
Table 2. Minimum Average Total Costs (ATC) of Generation by Generator Type 
Generator 
Type  
Min 
Load 
Max 
Load 
Start-up 
Cost 
Energy 
Cost 
ATC at 
Max Load 
Total Load 
(Quantity) Units Units $ $/Unit $/Unit Units 
A (2) 0 2 0 20 20 4 
B (1) 1 1 10 15 25 1 
C (1) 0 1 20 70 90 1 
D (2) 0 2 6 93 96 4 
E (2) 0 2 120 112 172 4 
F (1) 0 2 80 132 172 2 
G (2) 0 2 40 152 172 4 
H (1) 0 2 0 225 225 2 
I (1) 0 2 0 255 255 2 
Total 24 
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2.2.2. Unilateral Market Power 
The pairs of sellers are designed to be Bertrand-like competitors that share an 
identical structure of generation costs at the certain demand level. In off-peak periods, the 
baseload plants owned by S1, S2 and S3 depict the market structure with three 
competitors described by Knoblauch (2005) and later analyzed by Baltaduonis (2006). 
During shoulder periods, the intermediate cost plants owned by S4, S5 and S6 resemble a 
similar market but with different cost distribution. When the start-up fee bidding is 
limited, Knoblauch shows that a Bertrand competition game in these markets results in a 
competitive outcome. Baltaduonis (2007) demonstrates that this result vanishes when the 
bidding on start-up fees is unregulated and the market demand is cyclical. However, I 
argue below that the competitive outcome does correspond to a pure-strategy Nash 
equilibrium in the SOA. The market during the peak periods is also designed to be 
competitive. Five sellers with ten units of similar cost capacity are competing to supply at 
least six units of peak demand. 
 
SOA 
In the electric power experiment, a firm is able to exert market power in a sealed 
bid-offer market if, for a given distribution of ownership of capacity, a firm profitably 
and unilaterally can submit an offer schedule above its costs (or equivalently withdraw 
some generating capacity) such that the market price rises above the competitive level. In 
the SOA treatment, the costs for the marginal units and therefore, the competitive market 
prices in the off-peak, shoulder 1, peak and shoulder 2 periods are respectively 20, 99, 
172 and 93. In the SOA, there is no benefit to withhold capacity for later periods of a day. 
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Figure 1 and Table 2 show that there are at least two sellers who could supply the 
marginal units at the competitive market price during each period of a day. Such 
environment corresponds to a standard Bertrand competition game and is free of market 
power. Therefore, the market prices of 20, 99, 172 and 93 during the successive quarters 
of a day correspond to a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. 
 
COA 
In the COA treatments, at a given period of the demand cycle, the designed 
marginal generators have incentives to submit offers that are equal to the actual 
production costs of the marginal units. However, the asked fees do not necessarily need 
to be the actual start-up costs, as long as the asked seller prices are adjusted accordingly. 
Consider the OCM auction for an illustration. 
Take the shoulder demand period following the off-peak. Each S5 and S6 owns a 
marginal intermediate cost plant that competes to supply the marginal seventh unit to the 
market. Either plant can generate this marginal unit at a cost of 99 [6+93]. If a seller 
offers to supply the unit at a cost higher than 99, the other seller would be able to 
undercut the offer by either lowering the fixed fee or the offered price. Therefore, a 
competitive price that all sellers receive should not exceed 99 during the shoulder 
periods. On the other hand, the price that all buyers pay in this case can be as high as 155. 
This would happen if other low cost generators (Type A, B and C) decided to recover 
their costs exclusively through fixed fees, i.e. submitting offers with prices equal to zero 
and start-up fees equal to 98 (<99) for one-unit capacity generators and equal to 196 
(=2×98) for two-unit capacity generators. The OCM auction would select these offers 
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before the marginal offers of 99. As discussed above, the amount of fees would be used 
to mark-up the buyer price during the shoulder period [99 + (98 × 4 ÷ 7) = 155]. In this 
case, the buyer price of 155 would correspond to a competitive outcome in a COA. 
If we apply a similar analysis to other periods of the demand cycle, we get that the 
price (both for sellers and buyers) should not exceed 20 during the off-peak periods. The 
maximum price during the peak periods should be 172 and 230 for sellers and buyers 
respectively. And the price (both for sellers and buyers) should not exceed 93 during the 
shoulder periods following the peak demand. Notice that the shoulder periods before and 
after the peak demand have the same demand and supply structures. However, most of 
the plants are not idle after the peak period. Therefore, they do not incur start-up costs 
and do not receive start-up fees to continue generation during the second shoulder period 
of a day. For this reason, the competition during this period can be modeled as a standard 
Bertrand-competition game, where the competitive price equals the marginal cost.  
This analysis, however, disregards the incentives to withhold the plants during the 
lower demand periods because of the opportunities to extract bigger start-up fees during 
the higher demand periods. Notice that the additional generation capacity would not 
improve competitiveness in this environment, because the suppliers of the additional 
capacity would have the same incentives to delay the start-ups. A competitive outcome 
becomes hardly possible. By allowing the sellers to submit complex-offers, the form of 
the auction automatically creates market power. This result holds for both the OCM and 
the PCM auctions. 
The strategically rich environment of the COAs suggests that the sellers should be 
able to extract more social surplus by taking advantage of the offer complexity. A stirring 
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strategic behavior might cause frequent allocative inefficiencies. After observing quite 
unsatisfactory performance of the OCM and the PCM auctions in a laboratory, the value-
added of the complex auctions became questionable. As a result, I decided to run an SOA 
treatment and to compare the performance of complex- and simple-offer auctions, 
holding the production capabilities and demand levels constant. 
 
3. Experimental Design and Procedures 
To compare how the behavior and market performance differ in the complex- and 
simple-offer auctions, I conducted 12 market experiments using undergraduate students 
at George Mason University. Four sessions in each of the three treatments – OCM, PCM 
and SOA - were conducted using the experimental software that we developed at the 
Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science at George Mason University. Each session 
lasted 53 trading days. The dataset discussed in this paper includes a total of 636 trading 
days. Each session lasted approximately 90 minutes.  
The subjects in each market were provided with complete information on the 
market supply structure; i.e. every plant’s minimum and maximum production capacity, 
start-up cost, cost per unit and the ownership of all plants were public information. 
Information on demand, however, was not available to the subjects. The situation was 
framed as a market for identical product to avoid the use of possibly intimidating or 
confusing electric power generation jargon. An experimenter informed the subjects that 
the costs and production capacities for each seller would not change during the 
experiment, but that the quantities of the product that the computer buyer will purchase 
would vary over the course of a day. In particular, the instructions indicated that the 
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computer will purchase “low” amounts of product for the first quarter of a day, 
“medium” amounts for the second quarter of a day, “high” amounts for the third quarter 
of a day and “medium” amounts for the fourth quarter of a day. Each day consisted of a 
four period cycle: off-peak, shoulder 1, peak and shoulder 2 periods. The subjects did not 
know the total number of trading days in advance.  
4A subject had 75 seconds to submit an offer for each day.  An offer indicated the 
prices, start-up fees and quantities of the product that a seller was willing to supply from 
a particular plant over the course of the following day. The subjects could not alter the 
minimum and maximum quantities of the offer.5 These quantities were set equal to the 
minimum and maximum capacities of a plant. However, the subjects could still 
effectively withdraw the capacity from the market by asking extremely high prices for 
those capacity units. Thus, in a COA, a seller had to decide on the price and the start-up 
fee for each plant and for each quarter of the upcoming day.6 In the SOA, a seller had to 
decide only on the price for each plant and for each quarter of the upcoming day, as all 
start-up fees were set equal to zero. The instructions pointed out that the actual market 
price may be higher than their offered price and that all sellers would receive the same 
market price if their offers were selected. The sellers received start-up fees only for the 
periods when their plant had to be started. In the beginning of each day all plants were 
                                                 
4 An exception was made for the first day offers. The sellers could take as much time as they needed to 
formalize their initial offers. Once the last seller submitted his/her offer for the first day, the following 
trading days were limited to 75 seconds. The chosen time frame is similar to one-minute trading days of the 
RSW electric power experiments. 
5 ISOs usually demand an explanation if generators change their offered generation capacity or technical 
constraints. Thus strategic behavior is somewhat limited with regards to these parameters of an offer. 
6 I am aware that there are various initiatives to regulate start-up cost reimbursement (e.g. limiting the 
ability to change the start-up fees freely; and partial start-up cost reimbursement) for electric power 
generators in real life. However, the purpose of the study is to investigate the performance of the two 
auctions when such regulations are absent. 
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idle. An experimenter also explained a rule of offer selection. A subject could, at any 
time within the 75-second period, revise her offer.  
At the end of the trading day, all offers were sent to the computerized market 
coordinator. A market-clearing algorithm was applied and the results of a sealed-offer 
auction were sent back to the sellers. Each seller could see how many units she sold, what 
the market price for each period was and what profit/loss she earned on every owned 
capacity unit during each period of a day. The screens also displayed a history of the 
market prices from the past 10 days and the sold quantities during each quarter of the last 
day. The amount of paid fees was not public information.7
Subjects were paid $7 for showing up on time for the sessions. In addition to this 
show-up payment, the average earnings per subject for the data reported here was $21.55. 
 
4. Results 
On average, the SOA, OCM and PCM auctions extract 93, 92 and 94 percent, 
respectively, of maximum social surplus. All three auctions, on average, sell 32 units a 
day. Thus, considering that the demand side of the market is perfectly revealed in the 
experiment, lower levels of allocative efficiency must be attributed to higher degrees of 
production inefficiency. To have an idea how the captured social surplus is allocated 
among buyers and sellers, and how volatile the allocation is, Figure 2 depicts the buyer 
prices in each session of the three conducted No Power treatments. The last seventeen 
days of the data are grouped by level of demand (quarter) and then sequenced by how the 
demand varied over a market day: off-peak, shoulder 1, peak and shoulder 2. 
                                                 
7 See Appendix A for the experimental instructions and Appendix B for an example of a subject screen 
during an experiment. 
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I evaluate the results with respect to the true cost revelation. The outcome of true 
cost revelation is particularly interesting in electricity markets because the design and the 
engineering of these complicated market systems often start with the assumption of true 
cost revelation. In Figure 2, the outcome of perfectly revealed costs is shown as a solid 
line. The dotted line represents the value of the nearest unit of interruptible demand. The 
prices up to the dotted line are 100% efficient with respect to allocation. As an attempt to 
control for the convergence of the bidding behavior, I focus on the last 17 market days 
(1/3 of all days) in each session.  
From Figure 2, it is evident that the SOA is more likely to approach the true cost 
revelation outcome than either of the two COAs. Except for of shoulder 2 periods, both 
the OCM and the PCM auctions tend to significantly deviate from the outcome of 
perfectly revealed costs. In the SOA, the buyer prices substantially depart from the 
competitive outcome only during the peak periods. Notice that in shoulder 2 periods, 
most of the plants are already operating and, therefore, are not eligible for the start-up 
fees. Thus, at the end of a day the sellers compete purely on prices in all three auctions. 
The absence of fixed costs leads to relatively competitive outcomes during shoulder 2 
periods across all auctions. The conformity is not accidental, since all three offer 
selection rules are identical in the absence of fixed fees. 
In what follows, the experimental results are summarized as a series of five 
findings. In addition to the qualitative results displayed in the figures, I analyze the data 
using a mixed-effects model for repeated measures on each of several sessions using 
different subjects.8 The results from estimating this model for the buyer prices by level of 
demand are given in Table 3. The dependent variable in this case is the difference 
                                                 
8 See e.g. Longford 1993. 
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between the observed buyer price (Price) and the buyer price from the OCM auction 
when generation costs are perfectly revealed by the sellers, Pt. In the regressions, the 
OCM auction is used as a benchmark institution to represent the status quo. The 
treatment effects (PCM and SOA) are modeled as (zero-one) fixed effects, whereas the 
sessions are modeled as random effects, ei. As mentioned above, the experimental days 
are divided into three equal groups to capture effects like learning over time. In the 
model, the data from the First and Second groups (days 1-18 and 19-36 respectively) are 
identified by (zero-one) dummy variables. Specifically, the estimated model is: 
 
Priceij-Pt=µ+ei+β1PCMi+ β2SOAi +β3Firsti + β4Secondi +β5PCMi×Firsti+ 
β6PCMi×Secondi + β7SOAi×Firsti+ β8SOAi×Secondi +εij; 
 
where the sessions are indexed by i=1,…,12 and the repeated market days by j=1,…,53.9 
ei ~ N(0,σ21) and εij ~ N(0,σ
2
2,i). I begin with the findings related to the procurement cost 
and then follow with the results regarding the efficiency of the auctions. 
 
Finding 1: Ceteris paribus, changing the auction institution from a COA to a SOA 
significantly reduces buyer prices in the periods when start-up costs are relevant (off-
peak, shoulder 1 and peak periods). Buyer prices are similar in shoulder 2 periods of all 
auctions, as no new plants need to be started and, therefore, the start-up fees are absent. 
  
 
9 Similar mixed-effects models were used in other experimental studies of electricity markets (Rassenti, 
Smith and Wilson, 2003a and 2003b; Kiesling and Wilson, 2007). 
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Figure 2. Buyer Prices by Level of Demand for the Last 17 Market Days in Each Session 
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Table 3. Estimates of the Linear Mixed Effects Model of Treatment Effects for the Buyer 
Prices 
 
Support: Figure 2 clearly illustrates that both the OCM and the PCM auctions can 
produce higher buyer prices than the SOA in all three periods where new plants need to 
be started, i.e. in off-peak, shoulder 1 and peak periods. Except for peak periods, buyer 
Priceij - Pt=µ+ei+β1PCMi+β2SOAi+β3Firsti +β4Secondi+β5PCMi×Firsti+β6PCMi×Secondi+ β7SOAi×Firsti+β8SOAi×Secondi 
+εij,  ei ~ N(0,σ21) and εij ~ N(0,σ22,i) 
 Estimate Std. Error Degrees of Freedom Ha t-statistic p-value 
Off-peak       
µ 7.37 5.48 618 µ>0 1.35 0.1787 
PCM 9.64 7.73 9 β1≠0 1.25 0.2438 
SOA -8.58 7.70 9 β2≠0 -1.12 0.2935 
First -6.72 1.22 618 β3≠0 -5.51 <.0001 
Second -2.72 1.22 618 β4≠0 -2.23 0.0262 
PCM×First 4.25 1.46 618 β5≠0 2.92 0.0037 
PCM×Second 1.04 1.46 618 β6≠0 0.71 0.4749 
SOA×First 5.06 1.28 618 β7≠0 3.95 0.0001 
SOA×Second 2.35 1.28 618 β8≠0 1.84 0.0669 
Shoulder 1       
µ 18.40 4.09 618 µ>0 4.50 <.0001 
PCM -2.17 5.66 9 β1≠0 -0.38 0.7105 
SOA -19.53 5.71 9 β2≠0 -3.42 0.0077 
First -7.97 2.17 618 β3≠0 -3.67 0.0003 
Second -1.61 2.17 618 β4≠0 -0.74 0.4578 
PCM×First 15.69 2.44 618 β5≠0 6.44 <.0001 
PCM×Second 3.26 2.44 618 β6≠0 1.34 0.1809 
SOA×First -1.05 2.82 618 β7≠0 -0.37 0.7102 
SOA×Second 3.57 2.82 618 β8≠0 1.27 0.2054 
Peak       
µ 57.17 5.95 618 µ>0 9.61 <.0001 
PCM 2.96 8.41 9 β1≠0 0.35 0.7327 
SOA -17.02 8.44 9 β2≠0 -2.02 0.0744 
First -2.17 1.84 618 β3≠0 -1.18 0.2399 
Second 4.35 1.84 618 β4≠0 2.36 0.0187 
PCM×First -6.45 2.50 618 β5≠0 -2.58 0.0100 
PCM×Second -7.71 2.50 618 β6≠0 -3.09 0.0021 
SOA×First 11.42 2.59 618 β7≠0 4.41 <.0001 
SOA×Second -1.47 2.59 618 β8≠0 -0.57 0.5710 
Shoulder 2       
µ 0.83 0.93 618 µ>0 0.90 0.3709 
PCM 0.98 1.45 9 β1≠0 0.67 0.5169 
SOA 2.29 1.50 9 β2≠0 1.53 0.1615 
First -0.51 0.28 618 β3≠0 -1.80 0.0724 
Second -0.31 0.28 618 β4≠0 -1.10 0.2724 
PCM×First 10.94 1.25 618 β5≠0 8.77 <.0001 
PCM×Second 3.67 1.25 618 β6≠0 2.95 0.0033 
SOA×First 0.07 1.16 618 β7≠0 0.06 0.9539 
SOA×Second 2.61 1.16 618 β8≠0 2.25 0.0248 
Note. The linear mixed-effects model is fit by maximum likelihood with 636 original observations and 12 sessions. For 
purposes of the brevity the session random effects are not included in the table. 
prices in the SOA settle very close to the Bertrand competitive equilibrium, i.e. 20, 99, 
172 and 93, during the respective quarters of a day. SOA prices for peak periods do not 
come close to the expected competitive level of 172. My speculation is that the incentives 
to undercut the competitors’ offers are weaker in the peak periods because winning a 
marginal contract and setting a lower uniform market price also means smaller profits for 
the low or/and intermediate cost plants that the seller owns. On the other hand, there is no 
discernible separation in shoulder 2 prices. Since most of the plants are operating during 
the peak periods, no new plants need to be started when market demand falls. The 
absence of start-up fees makes the three offer selection rules identical, which 
consequently should lead to similar outcomes.  
These qualitative observations are supported by estimates from the mixed-effects 
model in Table 3. When the PCM treatment shows no significant impact on the buyer 
prices compared to the OCM auction, the SOA substantially reduces prices by 8.6 (p-
value=0.2935), 19.5 (p-value=0.0077) and 17 (p-value=0.0744) experimental dollars in 
the off-peak, shoulder 1 and peak periods, respectively. The prices in shoulder 2 periods 
are not significantly different across all three auctions (p-values=0.5169, 0.1615 for PCM 
and SOA, respectively).■ 
 
With less room for strategic behavior, the SOA harnesses the market power that is 
present in the COAs and significantly raises the level of competition in the market. The 
second and third findings describe the performance of the three auctions with regards to 
allocative and production efficiency. 
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Finding 2: Markets in the SOA treatment quickly stabilize at an allocative efficient 
quantity at all levels of demand, whereas the COAs continue to interrupt market demand 
throughout the experiment, especially during the peak periods. 
 
Support: On only eighteen occasions (out of possible 848 = 53 days × 4 quarters × 4 
sessions) the SOA exchanged an allocative inefficient quantity of the product. Seventeen 
of these occasions happened during the peak periods. The latest inefficient allocation was 
observed during the 12th market day in session 2. The OCM (PCM) auction experienced 
55 (24) allocative inefficient exchanges, with the latest observation being from the 44th 
(53rd) market day. 44 (19) or 80% (79%) of these inefficient exchanges happened during 
the peak periods. It is easy to see from Figure 2 that the last 17 days in all sessions 
resulted in 100% efficient buyer prices. However, this does not necessarily mean that all 
OCM sessions supplied the efficient quantity to the market during all those days. In fact, 
the demand had to be interrupted on 5 occasions (out of possible 272 = 17 days × 4 
quarters × 4 sessions), because the price for the efficient amount exceeded buyers’ 
maximum willingness to pay. Similarly, the demand was interrupted on 4 occasions 
during the last 17 days in the PCM sessions.■ 
 
Failure to supply the efficient amount of product to the market is not the only 
source of possible inefficiencies. The social surplus might also be reduced by production 
inefficiencies, i.e. the situations when the higher cost plants produce the product instead 
of the lower cost plants. 
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Finding 3: Except during peak periods, all treatments exhibit similar degrees of 
production inefficiency. In peak periods, the PCM auction achieves higher production 
efficiency than either the SOA or the OCM auction.  
 
Support: Figure 3 and the estimates from the mixed-effects model in Table 4 report 
evidence that in all but peak periods, the three treatments are not significantly different 
from each other. The dependent variable in this case is the difference between the 
observed production cost (ProdCost) and the minimum production cost for the exchanged 
quantity, ProdCost*.10 Considering the last 17 days in all sessions, the treatment effects 
are insignificant for off-peak, shoulder 1 and shoulder 2 periods.  
In peak periods, the SOA treatment raises production costs above the PCM level by 
83.3 experimental dollars (p-value=0.0298). The SOA treatment lowers production costs 
below the OCM level by 57.3 experimental dollars, but the difference is not statistically 
significant (p-value=0.1180). High production inefficiencies in the OCM auction stem 
from frequent occasions when the very high cost generators of H and I types are called to 
produce. The owners of the most inefficient plants (type H and I) are able to win 
contracts and profitably supply to the market by offering low prices and recovering their 
variable costs through high start-up fees. During the last 17 days of the OCM sessions, 
these plants are selected and make positive profits during 42 days [out of possible 68 = 
17days× 4sessions]. The same plants sell profitably on 6 days in the PCM sessions and 
never in the SOA sessions.■ 
 
10 An interpretation of the regression results might be problematic if the exchanged quantity fluctuates 
across the days. However, this problem does not arise here since during the last 17 days of the experiment, 
the demand had to be interrupted only on 5 occasions (out of possible 272 = 17 days × 4 quarters × 4 
sessions) in the OCM treatment, and on 4 occasions in the PCM treatment. 
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Figure 3. Average Total Costs by Level of Demand for the Last 17 Market Days in Each Session 
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Table 4. Estimates of the Linear Mixed Effects Model of Treatment Effects for the 
Production Costs 
ProdCostij – ProdCost*=µ+ei+β1PCMi+β2SOAi+β3Firsti +β4Secondi+β5PCMi×Firsti+β6PCMi×Secondi+ 
β7SOAi×Firsti+β8SOAi×Secondi +εij,  ei ~ N(0,σ21) and εij ~ N(0,σ22,i) 
 Estimate Std. Error Degrees of Freedom Ha t-statistic p-value 
Off-peak       
Due to the lack of variability of the dependent variable, the model cannot be estimated for the off-peak periods. 
Treatment averages and standard deviations are presented instead. 
Average Std. Dev.      
OCM 1.69 2.38     
PCM 0.00 0.00     
SOA 4.76 36.85     
Shoulder 1       
µ 37.02 17.61 618 2.10 0.0359 µ>0 
β1≠0 PCM 42.37 24.90 9 1.70 0.1230 
0.44 0.6711 SOA 10.94 24.92 9 β2≠0 
β3≠0 First 113.99 15.01 618 7.60 <.0001 
β4≠0 Second 36.72 15.01 618 2.45 0.0147 
β5≠0 -2.79 0.0054 PCM×First -58.36 20.88 618 
β6≠0 PCM×Second -12.55 20.88 618 -0.60 0.5481 
β7≠0 0.30 0.7653 SOA×First 6.28 21.04 618 
β8≠0 SOA×Second -31.00 21.04 618 -1.47 0.1412 
Peak       
µ 222.86 25.18 618 8.85 <.0001 µ>0 
β1≠0 PCM -140.65 34.81 9 -4.04 0.0029 
-1.73 0.1180 SOA -57.34 33.18 9 β2≠0 
β3≠0 First -65.92 23.85 618 -2.76 0.0059 
β4≠0 Second -50.64 23.85 618 -2.12 0.0341 
β5≠0 3.68 0.0003 PCM×First 120.20 32.70 618 
β6≠0 PCM×Second 97.20 32.70 618 2.97 0.0031 
β7≠0 1.64 0.1022 SOA×First 47.65 29.11 618 
β8≠0 SOA×Second 35.60 29.11 618 1.22 0.2218 
Shoulder 2       
µ 45.13 19.22 618 2.35 0.0192 µ>0 
β1≠0 PCM -3.62 26.87 9 -0.13 0.8958 
0.51 0.6208 SOA 13.81 26.98 9 β2≠0 
β3≠0 First 116.79 12.20 618 9.58 <.0001 
β4≠0 2.36 0.0187 Second 28.77 12.20 618 
β5≠0 PCM×First -55.59 17.20 618 -3.23 0.0013 
β6≠0 -0.85 0.3935 PCM×Second -14.69 17.20 618 
β7≠0 SOA×First -51.16 16.11 618 -3.18 0.0016 
β8≠0 -1.31 0.1912 SOA×Second -21.09 16.11 618 
 
Note. The linear mixed-effects model is fit by maximum likelihood with 636 original observations and 12 sessions. For 
purposes of the brevity the session random effects are not included in the table. 
Next I consider another criterion to compare the performance of three auction 
mechanisms – price volatility. Inflated and volatile wholesale electricity prices have been 
a concern since the deregulation of electricity markets. 
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Finding 4: The variance of buyer prices from day to day for the same level of demand is 
lower with the SOA than with the OCM auction for all levels of demand.  
 
Support: Figure 2 presents the dynamics of buyer prices in the auctions. Figure 4 
summarizes the price variances for the twelve sessions presented here. The statistics use 
the last 17 days of each session to allow for the convergence of the observed prices 
evident in Table 3. Individual session variances are averaged across each treatment. From 
Figure 4, it is clear that the SOA reduces the volatility of prices compared to the OCM 
auction in all periods. Lower price volatility in the SOA compared to the PCM auction is 
clear only in the off-peak and shoulder 1 periods.■ 
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Figure 4. Buyer Price Variances by Treatment for the Last 17 Market Days 
 
According to the above findings the SOA outperforms the OCM auction with 
respect to allocative efficiency, electricity cost to consumers and price volatility. The 
SOA improves over the PCM outcomes with respect to most of these criteria as well. On 
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the other hand, in the beginning of this paper, the concern was raised that the sellers 
might face a higher risk of short-term losses in the SOA. Finding 5 addresses this issue. 
 
Finding 5: Markets in the SOA treatment accumulate more short-term losses than in the 
COA treatments; however, the relative size of the losses is small.  
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Figure 5. Total Losses by Treatment for the Last 17 Market Days 
 
Support: The total amounts of experienced losses in the OCM, PCM and SOA sessions 
are 24346, 11679 and 38192 experimental dollars, respectively. The losses substantially 
decline towards the end of the sessions. The amounts of losses during the last 17 days of 
the experiment are 562, 973 and 1966 experimental dollars respectively. Compared to the 
earnings during these days, the losses represent 0.3%, 0.6% and 1.3% of market profits. 
Figure 5 summarizes the total amounts of experienced losses by quarter of the day. It is 
clear from Figure 5 that the SOA results in more short-term losses than do the COAs. ■ 
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5. Conclusions 
In the dynamic trading environment that models wholesale electricity markets, the 
SOA reduces prices to consumers, lowers price volatility and achieves allocative 
efficiency more quickly than either of the two COAs. These gains are achieved at the cost 
of higher risk of short term losses. The losses, however, are rather small in the described 
environment. The SOA prices converge to the competitive levels, while the COAs’ prices 
approach the levels observed in an environment with structural market power. There is 
less room for strategic behavior in the SOA. Consequently, the SOA is able to mitigate 
anti-competitive effects that are present in the COAs, such as the incentive to withhold 
the lower cost generation capacity for the higher demand periods and the ability to sell 
higher cost units by manipulating the combination of offered fees and prices. The 
outcomes for shoulder 2 periods, on the other hand, are competitive and predictable 
across all three auctions. Since the start-up costs are basically absent in the shoulder 2 
periods, one might imagine how simpler and more transparent these markets could be if 
fixed costs did not exist. But they do. And it is clear that allowing the sellers to recover 
their fixed and variable costs separately does not enhance the transparency in the market.  
For policy makers the lesson is clear: keep market institutions simple. Allowing 
market participants to reveal more information and trying to make use of that information 
also creates more opportunities to act strategically. If there is a way to strike it rich, the 
market participants find it. 
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Appendix A: Experimental Instructions 
 
<page 1> 
Welcome 
 
This is an experiment in the economics of decision-making. If you read the instructions 
carefully and make good decisions, you may earn a considerable amount of money that 
will be paid to you in CASH at the end of the experiment. 
 
The experiment will take place through the computer terminals at which you are seated. 
If you have any questions at any time, please raise your hand and a monitor will come to 
assist you. 
 
In this experiment, owners of plants sell an identical product to a computer buyer every 
day. Each day lasts 75 seconds. You are an owner of #yourNumberOfPlants# plants. 
There are #numberOfSellers# sellers and #numberOfPlants# plants including yours.  
Each seller owns between 1 and 4 plants.  
 
<page 2> 
Each day is divided into 4 quarters.  Each quarter is represented by a line in the table at 
the top of your screen.  The computer will purchase varying quantities of the product over 
the course of a day: Low, Medium, High and Medium amounts. 
Sellers submit offers to sell. An offer indicates the prices and quantities of the product 
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that you are willing to sell during the course of the following day. All quantities are 
measured in number of units. 
 
<page 3 OCM and PCM> 
You as a seller are able to decide: 
 
Price/unit is the price per unit you are willing to sell at during that quarter from that 
plant.  This is the minimum price at which you are willing to sell.  The actual market 
price may be higher depending on the demand of the product. Each seller receives the 
same market price for sold units during the quarter. The market price is the highest 
accepted Price/unit among all of the sellers. If you sell the product you also incur a cost 
per unit sold.  This cost is listed on the right side under the table and must be paid for 
each unit you sell. 
 
Start-Up Fee is a fee that is paid to you for turning on your plant. The fee is paid to you 
only if the plant was not operating during the previous quarter. When your plant is turned 
on, you also must pay the start-up cost, which is listed on the right side under the table. 
 
You will be able to make this decision for each quarter of the upcoming day for each 
plant that you have. 
 
<page 3 SOA> 
You as a seller are able to decide: 
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 Price/unit is the price per unit you are willing to sell at during that quarter from that 
plant.  This is the minimum price at which you are willing to sell.  The actual market 
price may be higher depending on the demand of the product. Each seller receives the 
same market price for sold units during the quarter. The market price is the highest 
accepted Price/unit among all of the sellers. If you sell the product you also incur a cost 
per unit sold.  This cost is listed on the right side under the table and must be paid for 
each unit you sell. 
 
You will be able to make this decision for each quarter of the upcoming day for each 
plant that you have. 
 
<page 4 OCM and PCM> 
To switch between plants click on the tabs at the top of your screen.  To enter the values 
select the appropriate cell in the table and double click. 
 
Some offer values are automatically filled in for you: 
 
Min Qty is the minimum number of units you are willing to sell during that quarter from 
that plant. Min Qty must be ≥ Minimum Capacity, which is specified under the table. 
This will be filled with that plant’s Minimum Capacity. 
 
Max Qty is the maximum number of units you are willing to sell during that quarter from 
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that plant. Max Qty must be ≤ Maximum Capacity, which is specified under the table. 
Max Qty must also be ≥ Min Qty. This will be filled with that plant’s Maximum 
Capacity. 
 
<page 4 SOA> 
To switch between plants click on the tabs at the top of your screen.  To enter the values 
select the appropriate cell in the table and double click. 
 
Some offer values are automatically filled in for you: 
 
Min Qty is the minimum number of units you are willing to sell during that quarter from 
that plant. Min Qty must be ≥ Minimum Capacity, which is specified under the table. 
This will be filled with that plant’s Minimum Capacity. 
 
Max Qty is the maximum number of units you are willing to sell during that quarter from 
that plant. Max Qty must be ≤ Maximum Capacity, which is specified under the table. 
Max Qty must also be ≥ Min Qty. This will be filled with that plant’s Maximum 
Capacity. 
 
When your plant is turned on, you also must pay the start-up cost, which is listed on the 
right side under the table. You will not receive the Start-Up Fee for turning on your 
plant. 
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<page 5 PCM> 
Offers are sent to the computerized market coordinator when you click the Submit button 
or when the day is over. Your offer from the previous day will be automatically 
submitted for you if you choose not to make any changes during the course of a day. 
 
The computerized market coordinator accepts those offers that satisfy the market demand 
during the day at the lowest total procurement cost, simultaneously determining the 
market price as the highest accepted Price/unit for that quarter. 
 
If your offer has not been accepted, it means that other offers were able to satisfy the 
market demand at a lower or equal cost. The results are displayed on the right side of the 
table; you may need to scroll to the right to see them.  Once you have reviewed the 
results of the previous day enter your offers for the next day for each plant and submit. 
 
The right side of the table is filled in after everyone has submitted their offers. 
Your profit during each quarter of a day is:  
(Units Sold × market price + Start-Up Fees collected) – (Units Sold × Cost/unit + Start-
Up Costs incurred) 
 
<page 5 OCM> 
Offers are sent to the computerized market coordinator when you click the Submit button 
or when the day is over. Your offer from the previous day will be automatically 
submitted for you if you choose not to make any changes during the course of a day. 
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 The computerized market coordinator accepts those offers that satisfy the market demand 
during the day at the lowest total offered cost. After the offers are selected, the market 
price is determined as the highest accepted Price/unit for that quarter. 
 
If your offer has not been accepted, it means that other offers were able to satisfy the 
market demand at a lower or equal cost. The results are displayed on the right side of the 
table; you may need to scroll to the right to see them.  Once you have reviewed the 
results of the previous day enter your offers for the next day for each plant and submit. 
 
The right side of the table is filled in after everyone has submitted their offers. 
Your profit during each quarter of a day is:  
(Units Sold × market price + Start-Up Fees collected) – (Units Sold × Cost/unit + Start-
Up Costs incurred) 
 
<page 5 SOA> 
Offers are sent to the computerized market coordinator when you click the Submit button 
or when the day is over. Your offer from the previous day will be automatically 
submitted for you if you choose not to make any changes during the course of a day. 
 
The computerized market coordinator orders offered Prices/unit from lowest to highest 
for each quarter of the day. Market’s bids to buy the product are ordered from highest to 
lowest. These two sorted lists will cross. The offered Price/unit where these lists cross 
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becomes the market price during the quarter. The market coordinator accepts all offers 
with Prices/unit lower than the market price. If there is more than one offer exactly equal 
to the market price, then as many of those offers will be accepted as it is enough to satisfy 
the market demand during that quarter of the day.  
 
If your offer has not been accepted, it means that other offers were able to satisfy the 
market demand at a lower or equal cost.  The results are displayed on the right side of the 
table; you may need to scroll to the right to see them.  Once you have reviewed the 
results of the previous day enter your offers for the next day for each plant and submit. 
 
The right side of the table is filled in after everyone has submitted their offers. 
Your profit during each quarter of a day is:  
(Units Sold × market price) – (Units Sold × Cost/unit + Start-Up Costs incurred) 
 
<page 6> 
A history of the prices from the past 10 days and the sold quantities during each quarter 
of the last day are displayed in the bottom portion of your screen. 
 
Information about all plants (including yours) is available to all sellers by clicking on the 
Technology and costs button. 
 
Plants are restarted at the beginning of each day, meaning that during the first quarter of 
each day you receive your start-up fee and incur the start-up cost if you sell the product. 
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 At the end of today’s session, your ‘computer dollars’ will be converted into cash at a 
rate of #exchangeRate# computer dollars to US$1. If you have any questions please raise 
your hand.  Press Start when you are ready to begin. 
 
Even if you decide to keep your offer from the previous day, click the Submit button. The 
experiment will advance to the next day after everyone has clicked on the Submit button. 
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Appendix B: Sample Screen Shot 
 
  
Figure B1. Sample Screen Shot. 
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